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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-RIGHT TO PLEDGE ASSETS TO SECURE PRIVATE
DEPOSITS-Bank pledged securities with defendant railroad company in order
to secure the continuance of railroad's status as a general depositor. Later,
the bank was placed in the hands of a receiver, who sought an injunction to
restrain defendant from selling the pledged securities, and for their recovery.
Held, that the pledge agreement was invalid and that pledgee must surrender
the securities to bank's receiver without return of deposit.' Illinois Cent. R. R.
v. Rawlings, 66 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
Until recently the validity of a pledge of assets by a depositary as security
for a private deposit has arisen in but few cases.2 The greater number of these
were in accord with the prevailing view as to securing public deposits,3 that the
pledge is valid in absence of a statutory restriction.4 In the public deposit the
pledge is usually a requirement of the depositor, whereas in the private deposit
the pledge is an inducement held out by the depositary. The latter situation
more closely approximates a borrowing transaction, yet the argument that a
deposit is a loan,9 and that as assets may be pledged to secure a loan they may
be pledged to secure a deposit, has not been applied in the private deposit
cases. Nor have the courts attempted to distinguish between the public and
private deposit. The right to pledge assets to secure public deposits has been
justly criticized. 6 but there being no policy of law to protect private deposits,
7
the right to secure them is a fortiori untenable. The law should foster equal
protection for depositors; 8 otherwise the large depositor will be able to exact
security safeguarding him against loss at the expense of the small depositor who
will bear the whole risk of the bank's insolvency. Banks could also borrow
money under the guise of a secured deposit and represent on their financial
statements a ratio of loans to deposits that would be inaccurate and misleading.
During the last three years, the validity of pledges of assets to secure private
deposits has been attacked in several cases.' The principal case represents the
'In State Bank of Commerce of Brockport v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750
(1933) it was held that the pledge was invalid but that the superintendent of banks could
recover the security only upon repayment of the deposited money with interest. Such a
result, giving the invalid pledge the efficacy of a valid one, cannot be supported.
'In favor of validity: Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215 (1880); Citizens State Bank v.
First National Bank, 98 Kan. 109, 157 Pac. 392 (1916) ; Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. 329 (1877) ;
Peurifoy v. Westminster Loan Co., 148 S. C. 200, 145 S. E. 7o6 (1928); cf. Richmond
County v. Page Trust Co., 195 N. C. 545, 142 S. E. 786 (1928). Contra: Porter v. Canyon
County Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522, 263 Pac. 632 (1928) (statute); Carter
v. Brock, 162 La. 12, 110 So. 71 (1926).
' There is a decided conflict of authority where public deposits are involved. See Note
(1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 608; (929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 916; (1932) 32 CoL. L.
REv. io65.
'For the various types of statutes see Note (93) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 6o8, 6o9, 611,
622; for the federal statutes see MAGEE, BANKS & BANKING (3d ed. 1921)- § 239; 2 MoRsE,
BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 2928) §§ 45 II, 245 II.
'This is a favorite argument of courts upholding pledges securing public deposits.
Williams v. Hall, 30 Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. 755 (1926); Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank, 158 Tenn.
282, 11 S. W. (2d) 673 (1928).
'Note (2931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 6o8, 617 et seq; cf. (ig28) 42 HARV. L. REv. 272.
Legislation has shown a policy favorable to public deposits, e. g., the surety bond re-
quirement. Also the ancient right of the sovereign to priority may account for the favoritism
shown public deposits.
' Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 16o
(2913).
'In favor of validity: Button v. Sanguinetti, i2 P. (2d) 1o85 (Ariz. 1932) (demand
certificates of deposit held loan) ; cf. Schramm v. Bank of California, 2o P. (2d) 1093 (Ore.
RECENT CASES
recent tendency to declare such pledges invalid, and it is significant that the
majority view as to private deposits may now be stated as being in accord with
the instant decision.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DOMICILE-MAINTENANCE OF SEPARATE DOMICILE
BY MARRIED WOMAN-A married woman, living amicably with her husband,
agreed with him that she should continue her domicile and pay taxes in New
York although he was domiciled in Virginia. The Commonwealth of Virginia
assessed the wife on her property and income for the year subsequent to her
marriage on the ground that her domicile was in Virginia. Held, that the wife
was to be permitted to establish a domicile separate from that of her husband,
and that the Virginia assessment was improper. Commonwealth v. Rutherfoord,
169 S. E. 909 (Va. 1933).
The common law rule I that the domicile of the wife follows that of her
husband, to which the English courts rigorously adhere,2 is based upon the legal
fiction of the identity of husband and wife and on the duty of the wife to dwell
with her husband.' This rule has been qualified by numerous exceptions which
have served by a process of attrition to dissolve its basis of theoretical unity.
The earliest relaxation appeared in litigation involving the marital status where
the adverse interests of husband and wife rendered impractical the theory of
unity which the common law sought to promote. 4  Therefore, most jurisdic-
tions allow the wife to acquire a separate domicile for purposes of divorce,5
regarding her for this purpose as sui juris. Some courts grant her this priv-
ilege when the husband is guilty of misconduct, even though no divorce action
is brought.' A few cases have gone further and have held that such separate
domicile, once acquired for the purpose of divorce, is acquired for other pur-
poses. 7  Heretofore, marital strife was a condition precedent to permitting a
1933); Schumacher v. Eastern Bank & Trust Co., 52 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
Contra: State Bank of Commerce of Brockport v. Stone, supra note I; Smith v. Baltimore
& 0. R. R., 48 F. (2d) 861 (W. D. Pa. 1931); Texas & P. R. R. v. Pottorff, 63 F. (2d) I
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933); McCown v. Edwards, 185 Ark. 620, 48 S. W. (2d) 558 (1932);
Wood v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 216 Cal. 748, 17 P. (2d) 128 (1932) ; Bliss v. Pathfinder Irr.
Dist., 122 Neb. 2o3, 24o N. W. 291 (1932).
Yelverton v. Yelverton, I Swa. & Tr. 574 (Eng. 1859); Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 94 N. J.
Eq. 14, 118 Atl. 685 (1922). The domicile of a married woman is during coverture the
same as, and changes with, the domicile of her husband. DicEy, Coxmn.cT oF LAws (5th
ed. 1932) lo7.
'Alberta v. Cook, [1926] I A. C. 444; H. v. H., [1928] 2 P. 2o6; Lord Advocate v.
Jaffrey, [1921] A. C. 146; (1928) 2 So. CALIF. L. REv. 188.
"The maxim is founded upon the theoretic identity of person, and of interest, be-
tween husband and wife, as established by law, and the presumption, that from the nature
of that relation, the home of the one is the home of the other, and intended to promote,
strengthen and secure their interest in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union
and harmony prevail." Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 18i, at 185 (Mass. 1833). I BLAcK-
STONE CommENTARiEs I*442; GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1927) § 30.
It can hardly be supposed that rules as to domicile will have any deterrent effect if
the wife in fact wants to leave her husband. It re Crosby's Estate, 85 Misc. 679, 148
N. Y. Supp. 1O45 (1914); (1914) 28 HARV. L. Rev. 196.
'Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8 (U. S. 1869) ; Marcum v. Marcum, 61 App. D. C. 332,
62 F. (2d) 871 (1932); Norris v. Norris, 224 Ala. 678, 141 So. 672 (1932) ; 2 BISHOP,
NEW COMMENTARIES ON DIvoRcE MARRIAGE & SEPARATION (1891) § 127.
In England a married woman cannot acquire a separate domicile from her husband
for any purpose. Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey, supra note 2.
' Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305, 36 AtI. 282 (1892) (husband abandoned his wife
without cause); Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 24o, 149 N. E. 844 (1925) (wife deserted by
her husband); In re Crosby's Estate, supra note 4 (separation for 26 years).
7 Watertown v. Greaves, 112 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. Ist, 19O1) (jurisdictional purposes);
Gorden v. Yost, 140 Fed. 79 (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1905) (action for alienation of affec-
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married woman a separate domicile." In McCormick v. United States,' a mar-
ried woman by agreement with her husband maintained a separate domicile in
France in order to avoid payment of custom duties. In that case a further
exception was engrafted upon the expressly recognized common law rule, the
court recognizing the independent domicile of a wife who was on amicable
terms with her husband. In the principal case, however, the court has made
a new departure in refusing to recognize the validity of the common law rule
of fiction attended by its numerous train of exceptions."0 It has clearly de-
parted from the traditional functional approach 11 and has definitely established
a new principle, recognizing as the basic rule that the personal domicile in fact
shall determine the legal domicile of a married woman.' 2
CONTRACTS-INSURANCE-VALIDITY OF CLAUSE ALTERING THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE IN ACTION ON POLICY-Plaintiff sued for benefits under a policy
of accident insurance issued by defendant, which provided that "the only evi-
dence of total disability admissible in any action against the Company at law
or in equity shall be proof of actual, immediate, continuous and necessary con-
finement of the insured . . . and (this) shall be the conclusive and only test
of total disability".' Defendant denied that plaintiff was totally disabled as
defined by this clause of the policy. Held, that the clause attempted to limit
the evidence that a court could hear and was invalid as contrary to public pol-
icy.2 American Beneficial Life Ass'n v. Hall, 185 N. E. 334 (Ind. App. 1933).
tions) ; Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442 (1914) (to bring an action
for damages against persons other than her husband); Shute v. Sargent, supra note 6
(probate of a will) ; Buchholtz v. Buchholtz, 63 Wash. 213, 115 Pac. 88 (1911) (letters of
administration).
'The unity of the marriage state prevented the wife from acquiring a separate
domicile, even though they had separate residences. Estate of Wickes, 128 Cal. 27o, 6o
Pac. 867 (19oo) ; In re Hartman, 70 N. J. Eq. 664, 62 Atl. 56o (19o5). In Carpino v.
Carpino, 7 N. J. Misc. 1121, at 1122, 148 AtI. 615, at 616 (1929), the court said, "Before
complainant would have legal right to separate and create her own domicile, she would
have to establish matrimonial offense, justifying her in leaving her husband."
'57 Treas. Dec. 117 (1930) No. 43804; (930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 780; (1930) 9
ORE. L. REv. 393.
"Principal case at 915.
' Courts in dealing with the problem in all prior decisions have treated the case before
them as an exception to the common law rule. Estate of Wickes, supra note 8 at 278, 6o
Pac. at 87o, "I am ready to concede that, so far as our statutes authorize the wife to live
apart from her husband, the rule may be relaxed. These are exceptions to the law, but in
other cases the law still prevails." In re Daggett, 225 N. Y. 243, at 247, 174 N. E. 641, at
643 (1931), in which the court refused to "add another exception to the general rule to
include the independent right of domicile of the married woman who is the actual if not the
titular head of the family."
' It is interesting to note that in a concurring opinion in McCormick v. United States,
supra note 9, Cline, J., stated, "It is essential that a married woman's right of free will in
the selection of the domicile which will best serve the economic interests of herself or her
dependents be safeguarded .... I object to the limitation placed in the majority. Since
the opinion states that the wife stands on terms of equality with the husband in respect to
property and civil rights, I can discern no reason why they should not have equal rights as
to the selection of a domicile, there being nothing in the rule to prevent, and, as shown by
the majority opinion, the common law rule has been practically expunged."
I Principal case at 345.
-In the same category with that in the principal case are the "conclusive evidence"
clause, most frequently found in contracts of indemnity, the "eye-witness" clause, and those
requiring "direct and affirmative" or "positive" proof. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Sheppard,
85 Ga. 751, 12 S. E. 18 (189o) (clause requiring "direct and affirmative" proof of death;
held that "countenance can not be given to such an attempt to vary the ordinary rules of
evidence") ; Reynolds v. Equitable Acc. Ass'n of Binghamton, 85 Hun 6o5 (N. Y. 1888),
aff'd 121 N. Y. 649, 24 N. E. lO91 (189o) (clause requiring "direct and affirmative' proof
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The courts of this country disagree as to the extent to which parties to a
contract should be allowed to alter the established rules of evidence. A nu-
merical majority, perhaps, in accord with the principal case, hold to the rule
that the parties can not by contractual stipulation control the law of evidence,
and that any attempt to do so is invalid, and binding neither upon the parties
nor upon the court.3 In support of this view 4 it is argued that (i) matters
of remedial procedure are governed by fixed laws which the parties' contracts
may not invade; ' (2) such contracts oust the courts of their jurisdiction; " (3)
they introduce an uncertainty into procedure; 7 (4) they are unreasonable, since
the insured will seldom know that he is surrendering rights given him by law.
8
It is thought that to permit the insurer to limit its liability upon a contract by
depriving the insured of the benefit of the settled law of evidence would open
the door to intolerable abuse. The other line of authority 9 holds to the view
that the parties are to be left to define on their own terms all matters appurte-
nant to a contract right 10-- saving always a contract induced by fraud or oppres-
of death; held that "the language of the policy can not be construed to take the case out of
the ordinary rules of evidence") ; see Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 664
(1887) (clause requiring "direct and positive" proof of death by external violence; clause
assumed valid, and interpreted on the facts). Contra: Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Barker,
93 Fed. 158 (C. C. A. 5th, 189) (clause requiring "direct and positive proof of death or
injury", assumed valid but held not to require eyewitnesses) ; Jenkins v. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 131 Cal. 121, 63 Pac. i8o (igoo) (clause requiring "claimant establish affirm-
atively that injury or death resulted from actual accident", assumed valid but held not to
require eyewitnesses).
' Utter v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 545, 32 N. W. 812 (1887) (clause requiring
proof of death or injury "by direct and positive proof", held invalid; "the parties to the
contract can not agree in this manner to oust the court of jurisdiction over such contract") ;
Modem Woodmen of America v. Michelin, ioi Okla. 217, 225 Pac. 163 (i924) (clause
requiring "direct and affirmative" proof, held invalid).; Note (193o) 68 A. L. R. 330.
4The attitude of the courts which preserve this view is well set forth in the following
case: Haines v. Modern Woodmen of America, 189 Iowa 651, 178 N. W. IOO (192o)
(clause setting aside the presumption of death, held invalid). See Wigmore, Contracts to
Alter or Waive the Rules of Evidence (1921) 16 ILL. L. REv. 87, 95-96.
Gaffney v. Royal Neighbors of America, 31 Idaho 549, 174 Pac. 1014 (1918) (by-law
of mutual benefit society substituting the period of life-expectancy, held invalid as "pre-
scribing a rule of evidence which would be binding upon courts") ; Reynolds v. Equitable
Acc. Ass'n of Binghamton, supra note 2; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, supra note 2.
7 CooL=, BIEFs oN INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 5892, 59o7.
This phrase has become a shibboleth in denouncing such contracts. McCormick v.
Woodmen of the World, 57 Cal. App. 568, 2o7 Pac. 943 (1922) (clause setting aside
presumption of death, held invalid as attempting to deprive a court of its ordinary func-
tions); Fleming v. Merchant's Life Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 1164, 188 NS. W. 703 (922) (by-
law providing that "disappearance or long-continued absence of member, unheard of, shall
not be regarded as evidence of death, or of any right to recover", held invalid as ousting
the court's jurisdiction); Arden v. United Artisans, I4 Ore. 225, 264 Pac. 373 (1928)
(by-law providing that absence of benefit member should not be evidence of death, nor
benefits paid without conclusive proof of death, held void).
It is argued on the contrary that such contracts tend rather to provide more specific
and certain procedure from the parties' point of view, their practical purpose being to
eliminate the uncertainties of litigation, foster quick settlements and avoid multiplicity of
suits. See U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Baker, 136 Ark. 227, 2o6 S. W. 314 (3938)
(conclusive evidence clause in contract of indemnity) ; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York v. Harrison, 274 S. W. 0OO2 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (contract of indemnity).
' Few persons, it is argued, read more than the lines promising to pay; and fewer yet
understand the remaining provisions of a policy when they have read them, so as to know
the legal effect of such a contract. Rollins v. Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 204 Mo. App. 679,
22o S. W. 302 (392o) ; Supreme Lodge v. Wilson, 204 S. W. 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
OWigmore, supra note 4, at 97.
"0 Becker v. Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 265 Fed. 5o8 (C. C. A. 8th, 392o) (clause
requiring proof of death to be made by eyewitnesses in certain cases, held valid) ; Steen
v. Modem Woodmen of America, 296 Ill. 1O4, 129 N. E. 546 (I92O) (by-law providing
that "disappearance or long-continued absence of member, unheard of, shall not be re-
garded as evidence of death or give any right to recover . . . until the full term of the
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sion; and that though the parties may by consent waive rules of procedure after
litigation is begun (confession of judgment, etc.), no court has pointed out any
reason of policy for discriminating here between an abandonment before liti-
gation begun and an abandonment afterward. Legally and theoretically sound
though this view may be, it is practically inexpedient. If such evidence clauses,
as in the principal case, were held valid the result would be their incorporation
in insurance contracts to the extent of depriving the individual of his oppor-
tunity to accept or refuse such a contract."
CONTRACTs-THIiRD PARTY BENEFICIARIEs-RIGHT OF LABORERS AND
MATERIALMEN TO RECOVER IN PENNSYLVANIA ON CONTRACTOR'S SURETY
BOND---Contractor's surety bond on a contract for the erection of a public
building for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was conditioned, inter alia,
for the payment of "all lawful claims of subcontractors, materialmen, and
laborers for labor performed and material furnished in the carrying forward,
performing or completing of said contract". In suit ' by laborers and material-
men for balance due them from contractor, held that laborers and materialmen
could recover on the bond as donee beneficiaries. Commonwealth v. Great
American Indemnity Co., 312 Pa. 183, 167 Atl. 793 (1933).
The confusion in the law of third party beneficiaries in Pennsylvania has
been the subject of extended discussion,2 some doubt being expressed regarding
the attitude of the courts on the third party's right to recover. The early case
of Blynire v. Boistle 3 decided that a creditor beneficiary could not recover, at
the same time laying down the dictum that a donee beneficiary did have the
right to release the obligation or to enforce it. The rule of that case in respect
to creditor beneficiaries has been frequently reiterated by the courts, but has
been subjected to exceptions which seem to cover substantially the whole field
in which the supposed general rule operates.4 These exceptions fall into three
general classes: (I) assumption of a mortgage indebtedness by the grantee of
the mortgagor; 5 (2) assumption of a testator's debts by a devisee; 6 and (3)
assumption of vendor's debts by the purchaser of a business.7 Recovery in such
cases is usually supported on the "assets" theory, the consideration for the
promise being the transfer of property to the promisor. The dictum in Blymire
member's expectancy of life . . .has expired, any statute or rule of the common law to
the contrary notvithstanding"; held reasonable and valid); Lewis v. Brotherhood Acc.
Co., 194 Mass. I, 79 N. E. 802 (19o7) (eyewitness clause held valid).
'Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Davis, 129 Kans. 790, 284 Pac. 43o (193o)
(contract of indemnity); cf. (193o) 28 MIci. L. REv. 1O46; (193o) 16 VA. L. REV. 719.
"The procedure followed was that prescribed by the Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 1181,
§ i, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1932) tit. 8, § 146.
'Corbin, The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L.
REv. i; Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 594; (933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 472.
'6 Watts 182 (Pa. 1837).
' See Corbin, supra note 2, at 13.
rDespite the express language of the Act of June 12, 1878, P. L. 205, § 2, PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon 193o) tit. 21, § 656 ("the right to enforce such personal liability [for the mortgage
debt] shall not enure to any person with whom such an agreement is made") the mortgagee
can enforce the assumption contract if he sues in the name of the promisee. See Lawry v.
Hensal, 281 Pa. 572, 577, 127 Atl. 219, 22o (1924) ; Brinton v. Davidson, 308 Pa. 371, 162
Atl. 905 (1932).
'Hoover v. Hoover, 5 Pa. 35, (1847); Dreer v. Pennsylvania Co. etc., io8 Pa. 226
(885).
'Though there is some difference in opinion on this point, the weight of authority
allows the vendor's creditor to recover against the vendee. Sargent v. Johns, 206 Pa. 386,
55 Atl. 1051 (29o3); Cox v. Philadelphia Pottery Co., 214 Pa. 373, 63 Atl. 749 (29o6).
Contra: Sweeney v. Houston, 243 Pa. 542, 9o Atl. 347 (1914).
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v. Boistle: recognizing a right in the donee beneficiary to enforce the promise,
found application in two subsequent cases." The effect of these cases was,
however, annulled by the Greene County case,9 which asserted the rule that a
donee beneficiary could recover only if property passed to the promisor as con-
sideration for his promise.10 The rule thus unequivocally laid down was re-
cently considerably weakened by a decision which held that such a rule had no
application in a case where the contract was expressly made for the benefit of
a third person."- This holding prepared the way for the instant decision,12 which
completely overthrows the doctrine of the Greene County case.1 The instant
decision brings Pennsylvania into accord with the more equitable and prevailing
view on the rights of laborers and materialmen under contracts of this kind,'4
and the language of the court'r5 indicates a very definite leaning toward un-
qualified recognition of the rights of both donee and creditor beneficiaries of
contracts to enforce them.
CORPORATIONS-RELEASE OF DIRECTORS BY CONTRACT FROM STATUTORY
LIABILITY FOR FALSE REPORTs-Plaintiff, holder of bonds of bankrupt cor-
poration, brought suit against defendant directors to enforce their personal stat-
utory liability for such corporate indebtedness. The statute ' held directors liable
'Brill v. Brill, 282 Pa. 276, '27 Atl. 84o (1925) (really a case of creditor beneficiary,
though treated by the court as one of donee beneficiary. See Corbin, supra note 2, at 2o).
Tasin v. Bastress, 284 Pa. 47, i3o Atl. 417 (1925).
'Greene County v. Southern Surety Co., 292 Pa. 304, 141 Atl. 27 (I927). The precise
holding was that the surety on a bond given for the performance of a public construction
contract was not liable to third persons who furnished labor and materials, though the obli-
gation required the contractor to pay for labor and materials.
'" See Greene County v. Southern Surety Co., stpra note 9, at 3io, 41 Atl. at 29. Brill v.
Brill, supra note 8, was disposed of by regarding it as decided on the ground of public policy,
while Tasin v. Bastress, supra note 8, was regarded as setting up a new exception to the rule.
See Greene County v. Southern Surety Co., supra note 9, at 311, 41 Atl. at 3o. Since the
Greene County case the public policy argument has twice been invoked to allow recovery by
the third party. Book's Estate, 297 Pa. 543, 147 Atl. 6o8 (1929) ; McDaniel's Estate, 3o5
Pa. 17, i56 Ati. 338 (i93i). In any case if a statute or local ordinance under which the
bond was drawn clearly gives laborers and materialmen the right to sue on it, they can
recover against the surety. Commonwealth v. National Surety Co., 253 Pa. 5, 97 Atl. io34
(i6) ; Robertson County v. Globe Indemnity Co., 268 Pa. 309, 112 Atl. 50 (192o).
Concrete Products Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 310 Pa. i58, i65 Atl. 492
(i933). The bond in this case expressly provided that it should be for the benefit of laborers
and materialmen as well as for the obligee, and in holding that a materialman could recover
from the surety the court relied upon this language of the bond to distinguish the case from
the Greene County case, supra note 9.
' The court in the instant case intimated that it took the holding of the Concrete Prod-
ucts case, supra note ii, as authority for the rule that, if the parties so intend, a gift promise
can be enforced by the beneficiary. See instant case at 191, 167 Atl. at 796.
'The majority opinion in the instant case makes no mention of the Greene County case,
but Mr. Justice Kephart, in a concurring opinion, states that the Greene County case is
overruled. See instant case at 2oi, 167 Atl. at 8oo.
' The right of laborers and materialmen to recover from the surety on a bond conditioned
for payment of labor and materials, given to the Commonwealth or any of its political sub-
divisions, is now secured by statute. Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 118i, § i, PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1932) tit. 8, § 146. This statute, however, was not relied upon by the court in the
instant case, except as establishing the public policy of the state in regard to the matter. See
instant case at 192, 167 Atl. at 797.
' The court refers with approval to the position of the CoNTRAcTs RESTATEMENT (Am.
Law Inst. 1932) § 345 (i) (b) and (z), favorable to recovery by both donee and creditor
beneficiaries. See instant case at 192, 167 Atl. at 796.
'MASS. GEN. LAws (i92i) c. i56, § 36, amended by Mass. Laws 1931, c. 313, MAss.
GEM. LAws (Ter. Ed.) c. i56, § 36. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
statute as it stood before or after amendment controlled.
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for all debts and contracts of the corporation if any required report was false
in any material particular, and known to be false. The bonds contained a-"no
recourse" clause protecting stockholders, officers, and directors from liability
"under or by reason of any covenants or agreements, express or implied, in
this bond . . ." Plaintiff alleged no loss by reason of the false reports.
Held, that the statute was remedial, and creditors might, by contract, release
directors from liability for future false reports. Continental Corporation v.
.Gowdy, 186 N. E. 244 (Mass. 1933).
This statute and earlier Massachusetts statutes establishing liability upon
directors for failing to act or acting improperly, have been construed as enacted
for the benefit of creditors alone.2  Similar constructions have been placed upon
statutes of this class by other courts,3 the decisions stressing the fact that the
legislatures did not adopt the acts on the ground of general policy, but to give
creditors additional security. Under this reasoning, no recourse clauses cover-
ing statutory liability of directors and stockholders where stock was illegally
issued,4 or where shares were not fully paid,' have been held valid in that the
creditor may sign away his rights. However, in Sinall v. Sullivan6 the New
York Court of Appeals, overruling the Appellate Division and an earlier case,7
refused to recognise the validity of such a clause when applied to future fraud-
ulent and illegal dividend declarations. None of the cases, however, seem to
recognise the dual nature of these statutes. They are penal in that they are
intended to discourage the performance of certain acts," which intent is evi-
denced by the imposition of liability regardless of a resulting loss, but they are
remedial in that the creditors, those most likely to be affected by such acts, are
given the only right of action. Which of these aspects to adopt is the question
before the courts. All previous cases may be reconciled, and the two purposes
of the statutes satisfied, on the theory that the statutes will be construed as reme-
dial, and the no recourse clause valid, unless fraud is an element of the case.
Fraud was present in Small v. Sullivan, while it did not appear in the cases
upholding the validity of the clause.9 In the principal case, it is difficult to
see how the directors could knowingly make false reports with any but a fraud-
ulent intent, but the court, failing to distinguish between this and the earlier
Massachusetts case,1" followed prior "authority", holding the no recourse clause
a bar to the bondholder's action. The doctrine of the Massachusetts court
seems dangerous in that the penal aspect of the statute is avoided; it is not
a doctrine to be encouraged.
-'Brown v. Eastern Slate Co., 134 Mass. 590 (1883) ; see Nickerson v. Wheeler, I18
Mass. 295, 298 (875) ; Child v. Boston and Fairhaven Iron Works, 237 Mass. 516, 52,
(2884); E. S. Parks Shellac Co. v. Harris, 237 Mass. 312, 319, i29 N. E. 617, 620 (i92i).
'Babbitt v. Read, 236 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. :2d, 1916); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Washington-
Oregon Corp., 217 Fed. 588 (W. D. Wash. 1914); Bush v. Robinson, 95 Ky. 492, 26 S. W.
178 (2894).
"Babbitt v. Read, supra note 3.
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Washington-Oregon Corp., supra note 3; Bush v. Robinson,
supra note 3; Brown v. Eastern Slate Co., supra note 2.
'Small v. Sullivan, 245 N. Y. 343, 257 N. E. 6i (1927).
'Small v. Sullivan, 2x8 App. Div. 612, 2i9 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1926); Monowitz v. Brack-
enridge, i86 N. Y. Supp. 686 (I920), aff'd 195 App. Div. 929, 186 N. Y. Supp. 688 (i92I).
'See Wall v. Metropolitan Stock Exchange, 168 Mass. 282, 8,, 46 N. E. ,o6:3 (i897).
Liability was imposed by Mass. Laws 1890 c. 437, § 2, to stamp out "bucket shops" by making
proprietors personally liable for all contracts.
'Babbitt v. Read, supra note 3; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Washington-Oregon Corp.,
ntpra note 3; Bush v. Robinson, supra note 3; Brown v. Eastern Slate Co., supra note 2.
" Brown v. Eastern Slate Co., supra note 2.
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CRIMINAL LAW-ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN MONEY BY FALSE PRETENSES
WHERE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT DECEIVED THEREBY-In order to obtain money
the defendant, a physician, falsely represented to the prosecutor, who was in
fact a detective, that by means of his "radio equipment" he had diagnosed the
disease of the sister of the prosecutor as cancer and that by the same means
he could cure this ailment. Held, that the defendant was properly convicted
of an attempt to obtain money under false pretenses.1  Commonwealth v. John-
son, 167 Atl. 344 (Pa. 1933).
Defense relied on a rule,2 that a prisoner cannot be convicted of an attempt
to commit a crime, if, had he done all he intended to do, he could not legally
have been convicted of that crimeY If the expression "had he done all he in-
tended to do" means "had he done all the bodily actions he intended to do and
bad they resulted as he intended they should result," this rule merely states
what is generally agreed,4 that in order to be convicted of an attempt to commit
a crime, the prisoner, when he acted, must have had the mental state requisite
to the commission of that crimeY Under this interpretation, the rule would
not prevent defendant's conviction.' On the other hand, if the above expres-
sion merely means "had he done all the bodily actions he intended to do" there
seems to be no logical justification for the rule. Assuming that the prisoner,
when he acted, had the mental state requisite to the commission of the crime
attempted, the mere fact that all the bodily actions he intended to do would
not have resulted, or did not result, in the crime attempted, seems immaterial. 7
I PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, ig3o) tit. i, § 2631.
'Which the court assumed applied to many cases of attempt, but claimed it did not
apply to the case of an attempt to obtain money by false pretenses.
'Defense argued that applying this rule, since, in order to commit the crime of ob-
taining money by false pretenses, the prosecutor must be deceived and part with the prop-
erty in reliance on thle pretenses (else the property is not obtained by the pretenses), an
attempt to commit the crime cannot be committed where the prosecutor knows that the
pretenses are false.
,CLeai, Can'iNAL LAW (Mikel's ed. 1915) 148.
'If all the results a person intends do not, in law, constitute a crime, he does not have
the mental state requisite to the commission of that crime.
'The evidence supports a finding by the jury that defendant intended "to defraud" the
prosecutor.
7Compare the following cases:
A is indicted for an attempt to kill B. It is proved that he had the requisite mental
state. He intended (i) certain bodily actions: (a) to aim a gun at B, (b) place his finger
on the trigger, (c) draw his finger back; (2) certain results: (d) that the trigger should
be pulled back, (e) a bullet should be discharged, (f) the bullet should enter B's heart, (g)
B should die.
It is also proved that,
I. A aimed a loaded gun at B, but was prevented from placing his finger on the
trigger by the intervention of a third party. (Except for the intervention B
would have been killed.)
2. A1 aimed a loaded gun at B, and placed his finger on the trigger, but due to the
fact that the trigger was rusted, A could not draw his finger back. (If the
trigger had not been rusted, B would have been killed.)
3. A aimed an unloaded gun at B, placed his finger on the trigger, and drew his
finger back, thereby causing the trigger to be pulled back. (Had the gun been
loaded B would have been killed.)
4. A aimed a loaded gun at B, placed his finger on the trigger, and drew his finger
back, thereby causing the trigger to be pulled back and a bullet to be discharged
but due to the fact that B was too far distant the bullet did not enter B's heart.
(Had B been within range he would have been killed.)
5. Same as (4) except that the bullet entered B's heart. However B did not die.
The rule relied on by defense, under the second interpretation, would prevent convic-
tion for an attempt to kill in cases 3, 4 and 5, but would not prevent conviction in cases i
and 2. From any point of view this result seems absurd.
A third interpretation of the rule has been advanced. It has been claimed that in the
ordinary case what a person intends stops somewhere between his intended bodily actions
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Defendant might have relied, with more force, on the theory that an act, done
in furtherance of a mental state requisite to the commission of a crime, is not a
criminal attempt to commit that crime, unless it results in a substantial social
harm related to the crime.' If the absolute purpose of criminal punishment is
retribution, this theory is logically sound. No doubt, historically, the absolute
purpose of criminal punishment has been retribution,9 as is indicated by the
fact that a person who does the same bodily actions, with one and the same intent,
may be punished in different degrees, or may not be punished at all, depending
upon whether his actions result in a complete crime, a criminal attempt, or a
non-criminal attempt.1" However, retribution, "an eye for an eye, a tooth for
a tooth," is certainly not an ideal purpose for criminal punishment, and a
departure from it is not to be regretted. The view, that criminal convictions
should be based primarily on the prisoner's state of mind, is a commendable
one. The result in the instant case is in accord with this view.
EQUITY JURISDICTION-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-RIGHT OF INNOCENT PER-
SON TO HAVE NAME AND PHOTOGRAPH REMOVED FROM POLICE RECORD-Com-
plainant, arrested in Hoboken, was finger-printed, photographed, and entered
on the record as "alias Luke Adams." His photograph was placed in the
rogues' gallery, and copies were sent to other cities and placed in rogues' gal-
leries there. Never having been brought to trial, he brought a bill in equity,
alleging his innocence (which was not disputed), and that he had never used
the alias, "Luke Adams," and praying that defendants (I) surrender his pho-
tograph, finger prints, and measurements, (2) cause the photographs and prints
in other cities to be removed, and (3) expunge from the record the words "alias
Luke Adams." The police then voluntarily surrendered the Hoboken photo-
graph and records. Held, that the defendants could not be ordered to secure
records from other cities, because it was not in their power to do so; and that
the words "alias Luke Adams" could not injure complainant sufficiently to war-
rant the interference of a court of equity. Bartletta v. McFeeley, 165 Atl. 144
(N. J. Eq. 1933).
To maintain in the rogues' gallery the picture of an innocent person prac-
tically creates the general impression that he is a criminal. Because of this,
the injury is greater than that caused by the mere unwarranted publication of
a photograph; yet, because the person has, in fact, been accused of a crime,
there cannot be said to be a libel.1 The notation on the police record of the
and the last contemplated result, necessary to the commission of the complete crime.
(Under this definition of intent, the mental state requisite to the commission of a crime is
usually more than intent. It usually includes hopes, desires, etc.) Under this view the
expression "had he done all he intended to do" may take on a third meaning. "All he
intended to do" may include more than all his bodily actions and less than all the contem-
plated results necessary to the commission of the complete crime.
Under this third interpretation, which of the seven cases do not constitute a criminal
attempt depends on how intent is defined. If, for example, A's inient is defined as including
only parts a, b, c and d of his mental state, the rule would prevent conviction for an attempt
to kill in cases 3, 4 and 5 but would not prevent conviction in cases I and 2. If A's intent
is defined as including parts a, b, c, d and e the rule would prevent conviction in cases 4
and 5 but not in cases I, 2 and 3, and so on. These results, under this third interpretation
of the rule seem equally as absurd as the result under the second interpretation of the rule.
It would seem that any valid distinction between the five cases should be based on the
differences in social harm caused.
'See Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts (1930) 78 U. Or
PA. L. Rxv. 962; Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts (xg31) 19 GEO. L. J. 185.
'I WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw (I2th ed. 1932) #IO.
"' See Strahorn, smpra note 8, at 968.
'Technically, (though surely not actually) there is implied only that the person has
been arrested by the police, and nothing as to his criminal character.
RECENT CASES
"alias Luke Adams," never used by complainant, is to be assumed an untruth,
and it would seem proper to find it libellous. In either case, the facts show
a clear invasion of complainant's personal rights.2 Can equity afford relief?
Since Gee v. Pritchard 3 it has been the dogma that equity protects property
rights, but not personal rights; also, that equity will not enjoin the publica-
tion of a libel, unless some other cause for injunction is alleged." But Gee v.
Pritchard, while laying down the rule, itself protected a personal right 6 and
since then, courts, by extending the content of the term, "property", have granted
protection to one's right not to have his name,7 his picture," or his literary
works " published. A few courts have openly asserted the existence of a right
of privacy and the desirability of protecting it.10 The only argument adduced
in favor of the dogma is precedent.11  Here, the court avoided this issue by
basing its decision 1 on the rule that equity will not compel a defendant to act
when to do so requires the consent of a stranger,- and on the ground that
the record, "alias Luke Adams," could cause no substantial injury.14 But courts
'The injury consists in the maintenance of the display and records after the need for
them has passed. It is conceded that the police have, in most jurisdictions, the right, based
on public need for law enforcement, to distribute these photographs. State v. Clausmeier,
154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541 (I90o) ; Downs v. Swann, in Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653 (909) ; see
Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 61g, I5O Pac. ii2, 1124 (915). Contra: Schulman v.
Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (i9o6) (but limited to persons merely accused of crime;
not applicable to convicts, and hardened criminals). However, if the person is proved to be
innocent, no such need exists, except in case of a person with a bad criminal record.
32 Swanst. 403 (Eng. i818).
'Bonifaci v. Thompson, 252 Fed. 878 (W. D. Wash. 1917); Brandreth v. Lance, 8
Paige 23 (N. Y. 1839) ; Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E.
442 (i9O2); Bledsoe v. Wesley, nz S. W. (2d) 718 (Tex. 1929); Baird v. Wells, 44 Ch.
D. 661 (i89O); cf. Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 28o (C. C. D. Mass. 1894); Atkinson v.
Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 8o N. W. 285 (i89) ; Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434,
42 N. E. 22 (1895) ; for a general discussion of the right of privacy, see Legis. (1933) 8I
U. OF PA. L. REV. 324.
Hicks Corp. v. Natl. Salesmen's Training Ass'n, ig F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 7th, I927);
Brandreth v. Lance, supra note 4; Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E.
163 (iO2); Yood v. Daly, 37 Ohio App. 574, 174 N. E. 77g (1930).
'The court enjoined defendant from publishing some private letters which the plaintiff
had previously written and had sent to defendant, on the ground that a person who has
written letters has a property in them-literary property. The real injury, however, was
the invasion of the right of privacy. Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality (i916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 64o, 643.
'Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (I9O7);
Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. New Cas. 402, i8 N. Y. Supp. 240 (i89);
Routh v. Webster, io Beav. 561 (Eng. 1847) ; Walter v. Ashton, z Ch. 282 (I9O2).
'Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. i9O, 5o S. E. 68 (1905) (photograph
of plaintiff was published in newspaper with false statement that he had bought insurance
policy from defendant); Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (888) (photograph
of plaintiff was used by defendant in the pattern on Christmas card). It is notable
that, in these cases, the photographs published were true portrayals, and were not placed
in settings such as would suggest something derogatory concerning the plaintiffs.
9Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story io (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) ; Gee v. Pritchard, stpra note
3; Booysey v. Jeffreys, 6 Ex. 58o (i85i).
" Pavesich v. Life Ins. Co., supra note 8; Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga.
257, 155 S. E. 194 (I93O) ; Itzkovitz v. Whitaker, ii7 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (i9o6).
See the strict reliance on precedent in Bonifaci v. Thompson; Bledsoe v. Wesley;
Baird v. Wells, all supra note 4; Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 681 (i9o4).
Instant case, at 145.
Reilly v. Cullinane, 287 Fed. 994, 53 App. Cas. 17 (D. C. 1923) ; Burgin v. Sugg, 204
Ala. 270, 85 So. 533 (i92o) ; Hart v. Turner, 39 Idaho 5o, 226 Pac. 282 (1924) ; Saler v.
Lessy, 76 Pa. Super. i5 (i92o).
" The court pointed out that, in comparison with the record of the criminal charge
against complainant, the injury which the entry, "alias Luke Adams," could cause is
insignificant. This, of course, is a question of fact. As to having the record of the charge
itself expunged, complainant's right could be based on the same theory as his right in
respect to the photograph.
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have recently granted decrees where the defendant could, by reasonable efforts
or expenditure, secure the needed consent.'5 In the instant case, a mere re-
quest would undoubtedly have secured the return of the distributed records.
The predicament of an innocent person whom people regard as a criminal is,
indeed, serious, The threatened injury is greater than in the cases cited" in
which the courts have granted relief. In view of this fact, as well as the fact
that the New Jersey court has previously expressed a very liberal attitude on
both questions here involved,1 7 it is unfortunate that the court in the instant
case did not face the case on its merits and frame a decree requiring defend-
ants to request the records from the officials in the cities to which they had
been sent.
PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS-REGULATION--VALUATION-ADOPTION
OF HISTORICAL COST AS A BASIS OF VALUATION DURING A DEPRESSION PE-
RIOD--Plaintiff, a public utility, sought to enjoin defendant, State Commission,
from enforcing new gas rates, which it attacked as confiscatory. The rates
were determined on two bases, one of historical cost and the other of "fair
value" of the going property with business attached, the Commission allowing
a 7.7 per cent. return on historical cost and 7 per cent. on "fair value". Held,
that in view of depressed economic conditions, both the methods of valuation
and the rates of return were reasonable and not confiscatory, and that therefore
the injunction should not issue. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Rail-
road Commission of California, 289 U. S. 287 (1933).
The principal case furnishes excellent opportunity to examine any change
in the Supreme Court's attitude in the voluminously discussed controversy-
cost of reproduction versus investment cost as the proper method of valuation
in rate cases. This controversy had its inception in the definition of fair value
as laid down by the leading case, Smyth v. Ames.' The definition there set
forth, specifically required consideration of reproduction cost new, original cost
plus betterments, and income and costs of service under prescribed rates, yet
left room for other considerations when properly required in a particular case.2
An objective examination of the Court's action in subsequent cases would con-
firm the belief that the policy of the Court is to vary the choice of valuation
'Cutler v. Lovinger, 212 Mich. 272, i8o N. W. 462 (1920) (the defendant, in a suit
for conveyance of land on which he held an option, was compelled to buy the land and
convey it to the plaintiff for $2900, when it was shown that he could exercise his option for
only $2298) ; Schefrin v. Wilensky, 92 N. J. Eq. io9, III Atl. 66o (792o) (the defendant
was compelled to convey land, as per contract, the land having risen in value, the court
believing that he was pleading the unwillingness of his wife to consent to the conveyance
as a pretext for breaching his contract) ; Meyer v. Reed, 91 N. J. Eq. 237, 7O9 Atl. 733
(192o) (the defendant was compelled to convey land, clear of incumbrance, upon evidence
that the holder of two leases for ioo years and more would surrender them-one, for io%
of the value of the land covered by it, and the other, for payment of the clerical expense);
Miller v. Ieadley, 7O9 N. .. Eq. 436, 158 Atl. 118 (1932).
'Supra note 8.
'7 Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., supra note 7; Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72
N. J. Eq. 91o, 67 AtI. 97 (19o7). The latter case involved a false birth record which rep-
resented a boy as the son of complainant though, in fact, he was not. The court held that
both personal and property rights were invaded and chose to rest its decision "technically"
on the property right.
As to the issuing of a decree in New Jersey when consent of a stranger is required, see
Schefrin v. Wilensky; Meyer v. Reed; Miller v. Headley, all supra note 75.
169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).2 Smyth v. Ames, supra note I, at 546, 18 Sup. Ct. at 434.
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methods to meet the hardships created by economic changes.3  This policy, not
so readily apparent in recent years because of comparatively stabilized prices
from 1922 to 193o, has been somewhat overlooked by both authorities and lower
courts, with the result that the reproduction cost theory had come to be accepted
as the exclusive rule.4  Two recent Federal lower court cases tend to affirm
this conclusion.' The instant case on the other hand, brings into bold relief
the basic policy of the Court, for the Court at least ratified as reasonable two
rate bases both historical in nature.6 The rationale of such judicial vacillation
is both legally and economically sound. Federal courts have no jurisdiction to
determine any exclusive method of valuation, and their sole duty in this type of
rate case is to pass on the reasonableness of the valuation as found by the
Commission.7  From an economic viewpoint, it would seem an unhappy result
if the Court were to bind itself exclusively to either rule of valuation, thus ren-
dering the justice of its findings subject to the caprice of any marked changes
'Commissions and courts although nominally discussing both theories of valuation,
during the rising price era ending about 1913 gave more weight to the reproduction cost
less accrued depreciation theory. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 52, 2-9
Sup. Ct. 192, 20o (i9o9) (fair value includes appreciation in value); Cedar Rapids Gas
Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 144 Iowa 426, 432, 12o N. W. 966, 968 (igog), aff'd 223 U. S.
655, 32 Sup. Ct. 389 (1912) (value was considerably in excess of the original cost);
Minnesota Rate Cases, 23o U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913) (reproduction cost new less
accrued depreciation was approved). In the period during and after the World War the
historical cost theory found more popularity. Waukesha Gas and Elec. Co. v. Wisconsin
RR. Comm., 181 Wis. 281, 194 N. W. 846 (1923) (court affirmed a prudent investment
valuation for the years 1913-1920 inclusive). Accord: Middlesex and Boston Rate Case,
I Mass. P. S. C. R. 99 (1914). See Missouri v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 276, at
301, n. 14, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, at 551, n. 14 (1923). From I922 to 193o, a period of relatively
stable prices, the Federal Courts became more insistent as to the necessity of using repro-
duction cost as the basis of valuation. Joplin and P. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
267 Fed. 584, 587 (W. D. Mo. 1919) ; Potomac Ele. Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,
276 Fed. 327, 51 App. D. C. 77 (i921); Public Service Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Public Utility
Commissioners, 276 Fed. 979 (D. C. N. J. ig2i) ; Missouri v. Public Service Comm., supra;
Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 679, 43
Sup. Ct. 675 (1923) ; McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 4oo, 47 Sup. Ct. 144
(1926); St. Louis and O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384
(1929).
'Thompson, Valuation for Rate Making, x932 (1932) 7 JouR. LAND AND PUB. UTr.
ECON. 225, 230, 233; I WHIiEr , VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE COR 0 Toaxs (2d ed.
Wilcox, 1928) 79; SmrrH, THE FAIR RETURN IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1932) 34;
West, Reproduction Cost Still Determintes Fair Valte, ELECTRICAL VoRI, Sept. 19, 1931,
reviewed in (1931) 8 PUBLIC UTIITIEs FORTNIGHTLY 554-
r Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Kan., 2 F. Supp. 792 (D. C. Kan. 1933)
and Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595 (N. D. Ill. 1933). Although, in both
cases reproduction costs were used as the basis for valuation, the courts compensated for
the effect of a declining price level by either allowing a higher rate of return (8% in the
Wichita Gas Co. case) or by fixing present values higher than reproduction costs (Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. case).
I The historical cost figure was arrived at by adding to the valuation of 1917 (as made
by the Commission) all subsequent net additions and betterments at cost (land at current
values). Instead of allowing but 6% (as carried on the books of the Company and so
allowed by the Commission) for overhead contributions to capital, the Supreme Court
allowed 11.25%, thus raising the Commission's historical cost figure to $6i,oooooo. The
"fair value" figure was achieved by adjusting the historical cost figure to include the
present value of property acquired at lower prices. This was done by the use of 4 year
average unit prices. The result was a "fair value" figure of $65,5ooooo. Both valuations
were made exclusive of ;7,5oo,ooo accrued depreciation.
'The Federal courts obtain jurisdiction of rate cases on the theory that private prop-
erty is being confiscated by legislative process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States-the guarantees of due process, equal
protection, and just compensation for property taken for public use by a State. The
courts are neither concerned with the quasi-judicial nor quasi-legislative functions of the
state commissions, except where there is an invasion of constitutional guarantees. San
Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 446, 23 Sup. Ct. 571, 574 (1903).
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in general price trends.8 Another interesting feature of the principal case is
the manner in which the Court treated "going value." It held in effect that
a substantial excess of fair value over a properly adjusted historical cost, in
the absence of persuasive evidence as to any greater amount, is sufficient for
"going value".9  However, in view of the fact that the main issue in confisca-
tion cases is reasonableness of result 1o and not the determination of exclusive
methods of valuation, the instant holding as respects "going value" conforms
both to precedent 11 and the requirements of justice.
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-RIGHT OF
SURETY TO SET OFF PAYMENT MADE AFTER INSOLVENCY OF PRINCIPAL-
Defendant, indebted to Corporation, became surety on Corporation's notes.
After maturity of the notes Corporation became insolvent and a receiver was
appointed. Defendant paid the notes and claimed reimbursement from the re-
ceiver. Plaintiff, subsequent assignee of Corporation's claim against defendant,
sued thereon and defendant sought to set off his claim against Corporation.
Held, that defendant was not entitled to a set-off. Pugh v. Conklin, 184 N. E.
847 (Ohio App. 1932).
It is generally held that a claimant whose right matured before the obligor's
insolvency may set off his claim in a suit by the insolvent or his assignee.1 The
instant case decided that a surety who paid the guaranteed debt after his prin-
cipal's insolvency, though it was due before the insolvency, is not in the posi-
tion of such a claimant. The reason assigned was that the surety had no claim
against the principal, legal or equitable, until he paid the debt. There are de-
cisions and dicta in support of this proposition,2 but most of the cases are
distinguishable upon the facts.3 On the other hand there is considerable author-
'For the danger in using either theory exclusively, see Thompson, supra note 4, at 227;
Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. P. S. C. for the First Dist., P. U. R. i9i8F 335, 347.
'The Court arrived at its result by excluding from historical cost the value of obsolete
equipment ($3,00ooo) and adding to this item the excess of "fair value" over historical
cost ($4,796,ooo) and from this sum deducting the lower court's error in respect to over-
head contributions to capital ($2,178,o0o), the result being $5,618,ooo toward "going value."
It rejected the conjectural estimates of "expert witnesses" as to a separate allowance of
$9,229,ooo for "going value," and held that sufficient had been allowed so as not to make the
valuation confiscatory. Principal case, at 316 et seq.
"oSupra note 7.
'The following cases represent the various methods by which the Supreme Court has
treated "going value"; Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, supra note 3 (no
separate allowance but the court was sure that the valuation included more than "bare
bones") ; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811 (1915) (05s%
plus organization expenses); Denver Union Water Co. v. Denver, 246 U. S. 178, 38 Sup.
Ct. 278 (1918) (separate allowance) ; Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 39 Sup.
Ct. 454 (918) (errors in valuation allowed to offset failure to make special allowance for
"going value"); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra note 3 (separate allowance).
For the proper weight to be attached to "going value' as an element of valuation, see
Lewis, Going Value and Rate Valuation (1928) 26 MicH. L. REv. 713, 741.
'Colton v. Drovers' B. & L. Ass'n, go Md. 85, 45 AtI. 23 (1899); In re Hatch, 155
N. Y. 401, 5o N. E. 49 (1898) ; Jack v. Klepser, 196 Pa. 187, 46 Atl. 479 (19oo) ; see Note
(19o) 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 393, 396; Campbell, Right to Set Off Claims Against the
Estate in an Action Brought by Receiver (914) 79 CENT. L. J. 237.
2 Huse v. Ames, l04 Mo. 91, 15 S. W. 965 (189o). But see criticism of this case in
Note (1926) 4o A. L. R. lo96, iio5. See Hammons v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 30
Ariz. 480. 485, 248 Pac. io86, lO87 (1926).
'Nearly all of the cases denying the right of set-off differ from the instant case in
that the guaranteed debt became due either after the principal's insolvency, Richardson v.
Anderson, lO9 Md. 641, 72 Atl. 485 (19o9), or because of the insolvency (cases of guar-
anteed bank deposits). United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wooldridge, 268 U. S. 234, 45
Sup. Ct. 489 (1925); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 237 S. W.
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ity for permitting a set-off.4 The division of authority rests upon a difference
of opinion as to where the greater justice lies. It is argued against the right
of set-off that a surety, until he has actually paid the principal debt, is some-
thing less than a debtor who holds a fully matured counterclaim, and this differ-
ence, together with the consideration that to permit the set-off would give the
surety an advantage over other creditors of the insolvent, is sufficient to swing
the balance of justice against him.5 The opposing theory is that a surety, when
he becomes liable for the debt, with the principal verging upon insolvency, has
a claim against him, based upon the right to indemnification, as clear in sub-
stance as any other claim.6 Being thus substantially in the position of any other
claimant he should be accorded the same treatment.7  This view appears to be
in harmony with practical justice; 8 a decision in accordance with it would have
been a more desirable result in the instant case, especially since the court was
not clearly bound by precedent to decide as it did.
TORTS--NEGLIGENCE---'ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE"-INIIERENT DANGER AS
TEST OF NEGLIGENCE IN CASE OF ALLuREmENT LEFT EXPOSED TO CHILDREN-
Plaintiff, an infant of seven, was injured in a fall from a stationary, unhorsed
van of defendant company standing in a public street and brought an action
for negligence. Held, that defendant was not liable because there was no danger
inherent in a sound, stationary and immobile vehicle standing in the street,
though unattended. Donovan v. Union Cartage Co., Ltd., [1933] 2 K. B. 71.
The rule has been regarded as well established in English courts that a
defense of contributory negligence or volenti non fit injuria will not avail against
an infant plaintiff whose fault is a result of the ignorant recklessness of child-
hood.' Each case under this doctrine in favor of infants involves two prob-
708 (1922); Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Austin, 208 S. W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App. igi).
That this difference may be important is indicated by the fact that in New York, while
set-off is not permitted when the principal debt matures after insolvency, Groff v. Friedline,
14 Misc. 237, 35 N. Y. Supp. 755 (I895), it is permitted when it matures because of in-
solvency. Kilby v. First Nat. Bank, 32 Misc. 37o, 66 N. Y. Supp. 579 (igoo). In the case
of Granger's Adm. v. Granger, 6 Ohio 35 (833), relied upon by the instant court, the
facts do not reveal when the principal debt matured.
"Where debt is due before insolvency: Merwin v. Austin, 58 Conn. 22, i Atl. 1O29
(1889) ; Scott v. Timberlake, 83 N. C. 382 (i88o). Where debt is due after insolvency:
Chenault v. Bush, 84 Ky. 528, 2 S. W. i6o (1886); Nolan Bros. Co. v. Dudley Lumber
Co., 128 Tenn. ii, 156 S. W. 465 (1913). Where debt is due because of insolvency (cases
of guaranteed bankd deposits) : Leach v. Bassman, 2o8 Iowa 1374, 227/ N. W. 339 (929) ;
State v. Bank of Magdalena, 33 N. M. 473, 270 Pac. 881 (1928) ; North Side Bank v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 127 Wash. 342, 220 Pac. 822 (1923).
' See Farmer's & Merchant's Bank v. Roark, 172 Minn. 8o, 82, 214 N. W. 792 (1927).
But see Merwin v. Austin, supra note 4, at 34, i Atl. at 1030.
'See Note (1927) 75 U. oF P&A. L. Ray. 647, 648.
' See State v. Bank of Magdalena, supra note 4, at 477, 27o Pac. at 883.
8 It may be difficult to find a legal formula with which to express this result, especially
if it is insisted that a surety's claim does not ripen until he pays the principal debt. An
interesting suggestion has been made, in respect of immature claims generally, that the
insolvency of the obligor operates as an anticipatory breach of contract, thus creating
immediate liability at least at the time of insolvency. Clark, Set-off in Cases of Imnmature
Claims in Insolvency and Receivership (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 178; cf. Laybourn v.
Seymour, 53 Minn. 105, 54 N. W. 941 (1893).
'The leading case is Lynch v. Nurdin, i Q. B. 30 (1841), holding that an infant plain-
tiff could recover for injuries suffered when third party moved horse and wagon of defend-
ant left standing in the street. The case was left to the jury under the questions (I) was
defendant negligent; and (2) was such negligence the cause of plaintiff's injury. Semble,
Jewson v. Gatti, 2 T. L. R. 441 (r886); Glasgow v. Taylor, [1922] A. C. 44. Contra:
Hughes v Macfie, 2 H. & C. 744 (1863) ; Mangan v. Atterton, 4 H. & C. 388 (1866), dis-
approved by Cockburn, C. J., in Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. D. 327, at 339 (1878).
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lems: how attractive must the danger be in order that the infant's fault may
be attributed to childish impulses; and how dangerous must the allurement be
in order that the defendant may be judged negligent in leaving it exposed.
English courts have held that the answer to the first question should be left to
be found by the jury as a question of fact; 2 as an answer to the second, the
instant court has imported an artificial test, that of danger "inhering in the
object", devised by judges who were overly tender towards the rights of land
owners and who wished to limit the rights of infants injured while on land of
the defendant.3 The status of neither class is involved in the instant case. The
test itself tells us nothing.4 Nothing is inherently dangerous: circumstances,
surroundings make it so. If anything, as Professor Bohlen points out,5 "in-
herently dangerous" means probably harmful in its expectable use. The test,
then, provides a rule for taking questions of probability of risk, i. e., of negli-
gence, from the jury, and putting them into the judge's hands. It leaves the
decision in each close case to the judge, and provides no standard for fitting
individual cases into a reasoned system of tort law. The attempt to provide a
yardstick for ruling out, as a matter of law, certain instances of alleged neg-
ligence, seems likely to produce only conflicting and inconsistent decisions
in the future." The test of "inherent danger" is meaningless; its adoption is
to be deplored.7
'Cooke v. Midland G. W. Ry., [19o9] A. C. 229; accord: City of Pekin v. McMahon,
154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484 (1895) ; Tibbits v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash. 570, 117 Pac. 397
(igix); see Wilmes v. Chicago, G. W. R. R., 175 Iowa IOI, 115, 156 N. W. 877, 88o (1916).
'Latham v. Johnson, [1913] I K. B. 398, cited by the instant court for the "inherent
danger" test, was a case in which an infant met with an accident while upon the land of
the defendant. The best theory of tort law requires that no special test or consideration
enter a case where an infant is attracted to activity which involves unreasonable risk to
him merely because of the fact that he must enter the defendant's close to reach the allure-
ment: the jury must decide whether defendant has been guilty of negligent conduct, in view
of the foreseeable risk to irresponsible infants. In fact, the English courts have treated
such cases (infants entering upon land) as sui generis, and have finally decided that a
defense of trespass may be set up against an infant plaintiff, Addie v. Dumbreck, [1929]
A. C. 358, despite the fact that the sanctity of the close is as incomprehensible to an infant
as is the concept of due care.
'A searching criticism of the test as it has been applied in the case of negligence of
manufacturers and vendors may be found in Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations
in the Law of Torts, Part III, American Cases upon the Liability of Manufacturers and
Vendors of Personal Property (195) 53 U. OF PA. L. REV. 337, at 357, reprinted in
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw oF TORTS (1926) 33, at 131.
I BOHLEN, ibid.
There is no evidence of any agreement upon factual situations in the decided cases:
no reason for supposing that any fixed test will produce satisfactory results. Latham v.
Johnson, supra note 3, held that an irregular heap of large paving stones was not "in-
herently dangerous". Contra: Ricketts v. Markdale, 31 Ont. Rep. 61o (igoo) (holding a
pile of lumber not negligently stacked to be "inherently dangerous"). The court in Kramer
v. Southern Ry., 127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (39oo) held that lumber piled in a street was
dangerous to children: Kansas City, etc. R. R. v. Matson, 68 Kan. 815, 75 Pac. 503 (904)
semble. Contra: Great Northern Ry. v. Willard, 238 Fed. 714 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917). It
was held that an excavation was dangerous per se to children in Perry v. Tonopah Mining
Co., 13 F. (2d) 865 (D. Nev. 1915) ; Baxter v. Park, 48 S. D. 5o6, 205 N. W. 75 (1925)
semble. Contra: Alvis v. Weaver, 2o6 Ky. 95, 266 S. W. 888 (1924). Finally, one court
decided that a team and wagon standing in a street was not of the class of instrumentalities
dangerous to children, Newman v. Barber Co., 39o Ill. App. 636 (3915). Contra: Lynch
v. Nurdin, supra note I (horse and wagon in street), the leading case in the field, cited
and not questioned by the English court which adopts the "inherent danger" test. Future
attempts to apply the rule must multiply confusion.
'American courts generally follow the tendency to be more lenient toward children
when the latter are in the street than when they have trespassed upon land of the defendant.
Note, 36 A. L. R. 34, at 148, and cases cited. In the former situation, some have followed
ordinary means of dealing with negligent conduct: Kreiner v. Straubmiiller, 30 Pa. Super.
6op (19o5); Kressine v. Janesville Traction Co., 175 Wis. 192, 184 N. W. 777 (1921)
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TORTS-NEGLIGENCI -- PROXIMATE CAUSE-SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
OF LIABILITY-It was found as fact that respondent had failed to exercise
reasonable care to remove highly explosive gases from the hold of a barge
on which libellant's intestate was working. Lightning struck, exploding the
gases and killing libellant's intestate. Held, that the fact that the explosion of
the gases by lightning was not reasonably to be foreseen did not bar recovery.
Johnson v. Kosnzos Portland Cement Co., 64 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
Although lightning has been held to be an act of God,' and has been re-
peatedly spoken of as such, 2 the instant court carefully avoided this classifica-
tion. The reluctance apparently results from the test of proximate cause an-
nounced 3 in speaking of "reasonable apprehension of the danger of injury
constituting the criterion of liability, whether the question be one of negligence
or causation". The court instead suggested that lightning was under the cir-
cumstances not so extraordinary a manifestation of natural force as might
not "be taken into account in regarding the probable consequences of a negli-
gent act". 4 Preferring, however, not to rest its decision on this rather untenable
conclusion,' the court described the true rule of the "doctrine of foreseeable
results" as being that if the act done produces unreasonable danger of injury
to another and is a substantial factor in producing such injury, it is immate-
rial that the particular manner of injury was not to be foreseen. Whatever
might here have been the effect of the lightning alone, had there been no accu-
mulation of gases this explosion would not have occurred. According to the
substantial factor test then, the formulation of which by the American. Law
Institute 6 the court expressly recites and approves, the result seems clearly
correct.7  It has been generally held that a negligent actor is not relieved of
liability where what is concededly an act of God concurs as cause of the threat-
ened injury.8 Although many courts announce the test of "natural and prob-
Others have introduced distinctions as meaningless and obscure as the test in the instant
case: Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896) (no liability for "common
dangers"); Massingham v. Illinois C. R. R., 189 Iowa 1288, 179 N. W. 832 (192o) (things
not in themselves dangerous).
'Mays v. Missouri & N. A. R. R. Co., 168 Ark. 9o8, 271 S. W. 977 (1925); United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rochester, 281 S. W. 3o6, affd 283 S. W. 135 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926).
2See Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. R. Co., 140 U. S. 435, 439, 11 Sup. Ct. 859, 86,
(i891) ; Parker v. Flagg, 26 Me. 181, 184 (1846) ; Klauber v. American Express Co., 21
Wis. 21, 24 (1886).
2 At 195.
'At 196.
Since the gases in no way attracted the lightning, however probable its occurrence
might be under the circumstances, the chances of it striking this particular barge seem at
most so slight that they cannot fairly "be taken into account in regarding the probable
consequences" of respondent's negligence. The admiralty court below (which found the
facts) and the dissenting judge both take this view, and logically applying the "natural
and probable" test of causation, accordingly find no liability. It is submitted that under
the test eventually applied by the majority of the court and the cases in note 8, infra, it
would make no difference if the lightning occurred in mid-winter or under such other con-
ditions as would make it wholly unforeseeable.
'RESTATEIMIENT OF THE LAW OF ToRTs (Am. L. Inst. 1932), Tentative Draft No. 8,
§310.
The argument seems unanswerable that one whose injury is substantially caused by
the failure of another to observe that standard of care imposed by the law for his protection
should not be barred from recovery by the manner, however unforeseeable, in which that
negligence operates to produce the injury threatened thereby.
8 Town of DeFuniak Springs v. Perdue, 69 Fla. 326, 68 So. 234 (1915); Watts v.
Evansville Ry. Co., 191 Ind. 27, 129 N. E. 315 (3921) ; Helbing v. Allegheny Cemetery
Co., 2Ol Pa. 171, 5o Atl. 97o (19o2).
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able consequences" as that of causation,9 few apply it literally 10 to deny recov-
ery where negligence to the injured party is shown. "Probability" is either
disregarded or considered with reference to the ultimate injury, not the manner
thereof."- It is to be hoped that the result of the instant case will be followed
without further lip-service to foreseeability as the criterion of the extent of
causal responsibility.
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR PHYSICAL INJURY ARISING OUT OF FEAR FOR
ANOTHER'S SAFETY-Plaintiff, standing at a window of his home, saw de-
fendant's truck, negligently operated, crash into the basement directly below
him. Plaintiff sustained no physical impact; but fright and alarm for the safety
of his two children, whom he knew to be in the basement, occasioned a severe
nervous shock resulting in serious, prolonged illness. Held, that it was imma-
terial whether plaintiff's injuries proceeded from fear for his own safety or
that of his children; judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Bowman v. Williams,
165 Atl. 182 (Md. 1933).
The instant case takes the second of two recent steps in the advance of tort
law. The first was recovery for physical harm resulting from plaintiff's fear
for his personal safety, when that fear was negligently caused by defendant.,
This is the ordinary "fright case". The second step, here taken, gives recovery
where the fear is for the safety of one other than the plaintiff. Since the Mary-
land court had already granted recovery in the first situation,' it found little
difficulty in extending the doctrine in the direction indicated, though the great
weight of American authority is opposed to the result reached.3 All the argu-
'See Stowers v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 2o2 Ala. 252, 254, 80 So. 90, 92 (1918) ; Hartnett
v. Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331, 334, io6 N. E. 837, 839 (1914) ; Beldon v. Hooper,
115 Kan. 678, 679, 224 Pac. 34, 35 (1924).
" The difficulties involved in an attempt to apply it literally and the legal gymnastics
employed to qualify the logical conclusions thereof, as exemplified by a series of Pennsyl-
vania decisions, are set forth in Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the
Test of Liability in Negligence (1goi) 40 Am. L. Ra. (N. s.) 79, 148.
' It is difficult to see what purpose such consideration serves, since unless there was
an unreasonable degree of risk to the injured party of some such ultimate injury, there
would be no negligence. It would seem that the manner of injury is what must of necessity
be the essence of any problem in causation.
'Recovery was allowed in: Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316,
73 So. 2o5 (1916) ; Purcell v. Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 5o N. W. 1034 (892) ; Dulieu v. White,
[i9ol] 2 K. B. 669. Contra: Spade v. Lynn, etc., R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897) ;
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896) with which compare
Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry.,
147 Pa. 4o, 23 Atl. 340 (892).
For general discussions of the problem see: Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Re-
sulting from Negligence Without Impact (1902) 41 Am. L. REG. (N. s.) 141; Throck-
morton, Damages for Fright (192) 34 HARV. L. Rav. 26o; and especially Bohlen and
Polikoff, Liability in Pennsylvania for Physical Effects of Fright (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L.
REV. 627.
'Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Harris, 121 Md. 254, 88 Atl. 282 (1913).
'In accord with the principal case: Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So.
927 (1912); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 794, 148 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1914)
(the dissent has the better of it on New York authority. It was absurd to refuse relief
in the Mitchell case, supra note i, only to give recovery here) ; Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.,
[1925] I K. B. 141; see Note (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 28o. Contra: the great weight
of authority, including Minnesota, Sanderson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W.
542 (19o), despite the enlightened reasoning of the Purcell case, supra note i. The TORTS
RESTATEmENT, certainly not ultra-conservative, defers to the weight of decided cases in deny-
ing recovery. TORTS RESTATMEENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) Tentative Draft No. 8, illustrations
under and explanatory notes to § 304. See also cases cited in Bohlen, CASES ON TORTS (3d
ed. 1930) 3o5, n. 18; Note (ig21) ii A. L. R. 1119, 1143.
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ments which were and still are advanced against recovery in the ordinary
"fright case" can be applied, with at least equal force, to the "fright for others"
situation. 4 But, as the court points out,5 underlying these arguments is a fun-
damental confusion of the interest threatened with the means by which the vio-
lation is effected.0 With negligence and the causal relation established, the pres-
ence of actionable injury 7 should complete the case for relief. The court is
to be commended on meeting the issue rather than reaching the same result
by assuming that the plaintiff's illness resulted entirely from fear for his own
safety," or by using the invasion of his real property as a peg upon which to
hang these essentially distinct damages. While recovery has so far been con-
fined to cases of fear for husband or child, there seems to be no logical reason
for so limiting the doctrine embodied in the instant case. On the contrary, it
is submitted that the principle which this court adopted should apply when-
ever a reasonable man should foresee that a threatened injury to A may cause
B physical harm through the operation of normal human emotionsY
TORTS-RELEASES---EFFECT OF RELEASE OF TORT-FEASOR UPON LIABILITY
OF PARTY NOT PERFORMING WARRANTY WHERE COMBINED ACTS PRODUCE
SINGLE INJURY-Defendant seller, after fraudulently warranting that he had
immunized cattle against disease, shipped them to plaintiff buyer. In transit,
because of the negligence of the railroad, an accident occurred injuring and
lowering the resistance of the cattle. This, together with defendant's failure
to immunize, caused the animals to contract the disease. In the present action
of fraud, the defendant sets up as a bar an unsealed release given the railroad
by the plaintiff for full damages arising out of the accident. Held, that the re-
lease to the railroad released the defendant as its joint tort-feasor. Coldwell
v. Lang, 166 Atl. O (Vt. 1933).
The instant case presents the problem of whether a negligent act and a
breach of warranty, combining and producing a single injury, must be classed
as a joint tort,1 necessitating the application of the general rule that the release
'The arguments most usually presented are: (i) the remoteness of the damage; (2)
difficulty of proof of causal connection; (3) "public policy" in avoiding fictitious claims
and multiplicity of actions. See Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, supra note I, at
320, 73 So. at 2o7.
The classic non sequitur in the field is that in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note i,
at lo9, 45 N. E. at 354: "Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is
obvibus that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom." Clear thinking will
show that the reason there is no recovery for fright is the absence of actionable injury,
which is not the case when the emotional disturbance is so violent as to produce tangible,
physical results like insanity, nervous prostration, and many lesser ills which modern
psychology can recognize and identify.
' See the instant case at 183.
'I. e., the sort of injury which the law compensates as distinguished from a mere sensa-
tion of fear.
'In most cases, as in this one, the plaintiff is so close to the scene of the accident that
the harmful emotional disturbance is undoubtedly a compound of fears for self and others.
This is a practical reason for the abolition of any difference in result between the ordinary
fright case and the fear-for-others case. New York and Minnesota are two jurisdictions
which have reached opposite results in the two situations. See cases cited in note 3, supra.
'Natural limitations upon human emotions render it unlikely that fears of unlimited
extension of this liability, through fright for utter strangers, will be realized. But it is
submitted that if as a result of negligence harm is actually caused through such fright, it
should be compensated.
IThe majority rule is that two independent wrongful acts which combine and set in
motion a force which produces a single indivisible injury is a joint tort. Van Troop v.
Dew, I5o Ark. 56o, 234 S. W. 992 (1921); Weingand v. City of North Platte, io8 Neb.
17, 187 N. W. go (I922) ; Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty Corp., 97 Vt. 336, 123 AtI.
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of one joint tort-feasor releases the other.2  If such classification is not man-
datory,' the rule applicable is that the release of one, not jointly liable with
another, is no bar to a subsequent action against the latter.4  The instant court
supports its decision by maintaining that the mere difference in the types of
wrongful conduct is insufficient reason to. regard the wrongs as several rather
than as joint.5 The decision is interesting, as an obligation of warranty is
generally regarded as contractual.6 The conclusion is lent support by the fact
that the plaintiff stied in fraud, a tort action. Also, when it is remembered
that a suit for a breach of warranty was originally an action ex delicto,' the
court's combining the two distinct types of wrong so as to obtain a joint tort
is somewhat justified. Nevertheless, in view of the modem trend to soften
the harshness of the rule of release,' and, as the rule is based upon a fiction 9
which the facts in the instant case do not substantiate, 0 some means should
have been found to circumvent the necessity for applying it."- Inasmuch as it
is admitted the plaintiff failed to receive full compensation 12 for his injury
the court might well have held that the technical distinction between the tort and
the contract action rendered the wrongs several, diminishing the damages by
the amount received from the railroad. Such a holding would grant both the
plaintiff and defendant substantial justice.
192 (1924) ; Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 22o Pac. 782 (1923) ; I CooLEY, TORTS (4th
ed. 1932) § 86, n. 41. There is a minority view which requires concert of action or common
design between the wrongdoers. Mason v. Copeland & Co., 27 R. I. 232, 6I Atl. 65o
(i9o5) ; I COOLEY, op. cit. supra § 86, n. 42. See City of Valparaiso v. Moffitt, 12 Ind.
App. 250, 253, 39 N. E. 909, 911 (895) ; Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., III Tenn. 430,
439, 78 S. W. 93, 94 (903).
'Peteri v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 41 Ohio App. IO5, 179 N. E. 8,7 (1931);
Mason v. Lavine, 302 Pa. 472, 353 Atl. 754 (I93I) ; I CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 83, n. 4.
'It is felt that, unless the instant court had no alternative but to find the action joint,
it should have been found to be several. This attitude is desirous because, by the imposition
of the general rule of release, the defendant is relieved of all liability for his wrong and the
plaintiff fails to receive full satisfaction. Infra note io.
'Wallner v. Barry, 207 Cal. 465, 279 Pac. 148 (1929); Pickwick v. McCauliff, i93
Mass. 70, 78 N. E 730 (19o6) ; Brimer v. Scheibel, 154 Tenn. 253, 290 S. W. 5 (1926).
Instant case at 13.
6 1 WILLIsToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 197.
'Id. at § 195.
' For a good discussion showing the gradual whittling away of the general rule of
release, see: Schmidt v. Austin, 26 Ohio App. 240, 359 N. E. 85o (I927), Note (I928) 13
CORN. L. Q. 473; Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 Pac. 577 (1930), (193I) 79 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 287; (i02I) 69 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 287. Several states, realizing the harshness
of the rule, have passed statutes declaring the release of one joint tort-feasor does not re-
lease the other. ALA. CODE ANN. (1928) § 7669; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) c. 27, §3268;
W. VA. CODE ANN. (1932) c. 55, § 5481.
'The general rule of release is based upon the theory that a person is entitled to but
one satisfaction and the granting of the release implies the receipt of full satisfaction. See
discussion in Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915); I WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (i920) 649.
'0 The purchase price of the 24 cows and ix calves was $4,318. The plaintiff received
$1500 from the railroad. As a result of the disease 13 of the cattle became absolutely
worthless and the remainder were unfit to produce the high grade milk for which purpose
they had been purchased.
' Some courts evade the imposition of the general rule by declaring the writing is not
a release but merely a covenant not to sue which does not extinguish the liability of the
other joint tort-feasors. Altman-Rodgers Co. v. Smith, 185 Ark. IoO, 46 S. W. (2d) 4
(1932) ; Shapiro v. Lyon, 254 Mass. 33o, 149 N. E. 543 (1925); Davis v. Moses, 172 Minn.
171, 215 N. W. 225 (3927); German-American Coffee Co. v. O'Neil, 102 Misc. Rep. I65,
369 N. Y. S. 421 (I938). It has also been held that if there has been reserved the right
to proceed against the other joint tort-feasors, the cause of action is not extinguished as to
them. Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 3OO Ohio St. 348, 126 N. E. 300 (1919); see
Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 295, 222 Pac. 586, 588 (I924). Contra: Sunset
Copper Co. v. Zickrick, 125 Wash. 565, 217 Pac. 5 (1923).
'Instant case at I4: "It reasonably appears from the record that, if he had sued the
railroad, he probably could have collected a larger amount than he received in settlement."
RECENT CASES
TRUST RECEIPTS--CIATTEL MORTGAGES-VALIDITY OF UNRECORDED
TRUST RECEIPTS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES-An automobile dealer received
possession of automobiles from a distributor upon payment of the purchase
price by a finance company. As security for such advance the dealer executed
a trust receipt' to the finance company which had also received a bill of sale
from the distributor. A statute required chattel mortgages to be recorded.2
Held, that the finance company's reservation of title was invalid against the
dealer's creditors, the trust receipt not having been recorded.8 General Motors
Acceptance Corporation v. Berry, 167 Atl. 553 (N. H. 1933).
The trust receipt, a security device of recent development, has been classi-
fied as a conditional sale,4 a chattel mortgage 5 and as a transaction sui geners,
possessing legal incidents peculiar to itself. The principal necessity for a pre-
cise classification is to determine whether the trust receipt is within the pur-
view of the recording statutes which require chattel mortgages and conditional
sales to be recorded to sustain their validity against third parties. Before 1930
a majority of the cases held that the trust receipt was neither a conditional sale
nor a chattel mortgage and, therefore, valid without recording.7 The trans-
action was distinguished from a conditional sale by the fact that the lender,
holding a security title, was not the vendor of the goods as in the case of a
conditional sale; and from a chattel mortgage by the fact that the lender de-
rived his security title from a third party, the vendor, and not from the bor-
rower as in a chattel mortgage." In the past few years, however, there has
been a decided tendency to disregard the tripartite distinction and to require
trust receipts to be recorded as chattel mortgages on the ground that this is
the type of transaction which was intended to fall within the chattel mortgage
recording acts.9 However, the problem of whether or not a trust receipt should
be recorded should not be made to turn on merely formal distinctions in the
manner of its creation. Ultimately, the problem resolves itself into one of eco-
nomic policy. The courts are faced with this fundamental consideration: on a
balancing of interests is it more desirable that the finance companies should
be spared the burden and expense of recording short term credit transactions
or that the occasional creditor who examines the records should be protected? 10
We cannot look to the courts for a satisfactory solution for they can choose
only between two extremes and hold that trust receipts either must or need not
be recorded, thus protecting one interest only at the expense of the other. A
'In a typical trust receipt the dealer agrees to hold the automobiles for the finance
company and to return them on demand, not to mortgage or incumber them, and to hold
separate and apart from its own funds the moneys received from any sale thereof, which
moneys are to be delivered to the finance company on demand.
"N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 216, §2.
The decision, owing to facts not here stated, was actually in favor of the finance
company.
'Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 202 Iowa 938, 211 N. W. 248 (i26).
'Karkuff v. Mutual Securities Co., io8 N. J. Eq. 128, 148 Atl. 59 (193o); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boddeker, 274 S. W. io16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
'It re E. Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 Fed. 245 (D. N. J. i9o8) ; In re Cattus, 183 Fed.
733 (C. C. A. 2d, 191o); Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d,
1912) ; it re James, Inc., 3o F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) ; Houck v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 44 F. (2d) 410 (W. D. Pa. 193o).
I Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 674, 675; Legis. (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 456, 457.
'In re James, Inc., supra note 6.
'At least nine cases in seven different jurisdictions have required recording since 193o.
Typical is Smith v. Commercial Credit Corp., 113 N. J. Eq. 12, 165 Atl. 637 (933).
" iFrederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 395; Vold, Trust
Receipt Security in Financing of Sales (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 543, 559; Williston, The
Progress of the Law, 1919-192o (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 741, 758; Developments in; the
Law (1931) 45 id. at 1374, 1424-26; Hanna, Trust Receipts (1931) ig CAL. L. REv. 255;
Note (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. REv. x97.
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compromise recording requirement, combining the desirable and eliminating the
undesirable features of both views, is necessary. The proposed Uniform Trust
Receipt Act contains such a provision.-- By giving validity to trust receipts
for thirty days without recording, the business of the finance companies is not
unduly hampered and at the same time substantial protection is accorded the
cautious creditor.'2 The widespread adoption of this Act presents itself as
the only practical solution of the dilemma in which courts find themselves when
faced with the construction of a trust receipt.
'The final draft of this Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws at its 1933 meeting, and the Act was later approved by the
American Bar Association at its meeting. §§ 7 and 8 pertain to recording.
2Legis. (1927) 27 CoL L. REV. 456 (discusses third draft of the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act).
